Readings From the Course

The first summary of each week is based on the correspondant chapter of the book "Strategy in the Contemporary World"

- Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J., & Gray, C. S. (Eds.). (2019). Strategy in the contemporary world (SIXTH EDITION). https://robertedwinkelly.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/strategy-in-the-contemporary-world-6e.pdf#page=16/

Week 2

The Evolution of Modern Warfare (Book Chapter)

This chapter begins by explaining the term modern warfare, which refers to forms of war shaped by the modern era of human history. Carl von Clausewitz argued that the prevailing form of war always reflects the age in which it occurs. The author discusses the Napoleonic Wars, the decline of limited warfare, the industrialization of conflict, and the development of new military technologies. The Napoleonic style of war deployed massive armies in decisive campaigns aimed at destroying the enemy’s capacity to resist. The nineteenth century marked a tactical evolution with rifled and breech-loading weapons, machine guns, armored ships, mines, and submarines. Naval warfare also transformed with heavy guns in revolving turrets and ironclad battleships. By the twentieth century, industrialization had become essential to political and military goals. In total war, governments demanded as much from their citizens as they were ruthless toward their enemies. The Second World War cemented air power and aircraft carriers as decisive weapons. Though less likely, wars between great powers remain possible.

The Uses of Forces

This article discusses why the use of force continues to exist. Even within the developed and wealthy world, where a great power war is unlikely, military strength remains a useful instrument of statecraft. If it were not, such states would have long since disarmed. Threats to the security of states remain real, and war among them has not been abolished. The central themes of the article are the political uses of force, its utility today, and the nuclear future. The defensive use of force refers to the deployment of military power to achieve two objectives: to repel an attack and to minimize damage if attacked. The term deterrence is explained as the use of military power to prevent an adversary from taking an undesired action. The compellent use of force, by contrast, seeks either to stop an adversary’s ongoing behavior or to make them take an action not yet undertaken. Finally, the article explores the difference between diplomacy and force, noting that diplomacy seeks mutually acceptable outcomes preferable to conflict.

Week 3

Strategic theory & the practice of Strategy (Book Chapter)

This chapter recounts the history of strategy from antiquity. The Eastern Romans, or Byzantines, defined the term strategy as the use of all instruments of statecraft in addition to military means. Evidence of complex decision-making that integrated multiple tools of power became more apparent as the Middle Ages progressed. During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the term guerrilla (meaning “small war”) evolved to signify a people’s war or insurgency. Throughout history, key decision-makers conducting wars have faced choices about how best to allocate resources for their conduct. Strategy, at its core, concerns how to win wars; it serves as the vital connection between political objectives and military force, between ends and means. Thinkers such as Clausewitz argued that war represents a paradoxical trinity composed of passion, probability, and reason—corresponding respectively to the people, the military, and the government. Similarly, Sun Tzu emphasized that success in war derives not from annihilating the enemy’s army but from breaking the adversary’s will to fight, achieving victory through strategic wisdom.

Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction

Garard, O. (2023, January 26). Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/reconsidering-clausewitz-on-friction/

In the article, Garard revisits Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of friction the gap between war as planned and war as experienced—arguing that many underestimate its significance. She contrasts Clausewitz’s view with that of John Boyd, who criticises him for focusing on reducing friction rather than actively creating it for the adversary. Garard explains that for Clausewitz friction isn’t a weapon to be unleashed but a condition intrinsic to warfare: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chaos that distort thought and action. She uses examples like travel delays to illustrate how even simple tasks become difficult under friction. Logistics, morale, information distortion, and human exhaustion are all sources of friction. Clausewitz acknowledges many causes of friction subordinate trust, supply issues, misjudging the enemy but insists they can’t be fully enumerated. Garard argues that while Boyd would emphasise disrupting the enemy’s model, Clausewitz still prioritises reducing one’s own friction and adapting one’s model realistically. The message: war will betray its theoretical model, so commanders must train, habituate and prepare for the unpredictable.

Nine Links in the Chain: The Weponaized Narrative, Sun Tzu, and The Essence of War

Herrmann, J. (2017, July 27). The Strategy Bridge. The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/7/27/nine-links-in-the-chain-the-weaponized-narrative-sun-tzu-and-the-essence-of-war?rq=sun%20tzu

The article argues that in the modern information environment the narrative has become a strategic weapon a weaponized narrative that operates much like a disease, non-kinetic yet highly destructive. It defines six features distinguishing these narratives: vector, vulnerability, virulence, scope, speed, and synergy. Drawing on Sun Tzu, the author presents nine “links” or principles that connect Sun Tzu’s timeless wisdom to this new domain of contestation. These include recognising non-kinetic force, sowing division between adversary unity, favouring chaos to exhaust the unprepared, undermining the enemy’s strategy, leveraging cheap narratives to compensate for limited means, pre-empting war by attacking will, concentrating combined energy and resources in the narrative domain, exploiting surprise and speed, and attacking the undefended mind. The piece concludes that in an era where stories spread globally in seconds, controlling minds and perceptions may matter more than tanks or bombs. The challenge for states is to integrate narrative strategy into their overall warfighting and statecraft toolkit.

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Week 4

Strategic Culture (Book Chapter)

The chapter begins by analyzing the three approaches to strategic culture. The first views culture as a value-added explanation of strategic behavior. The second approach sees culture as a conceptual framework that can explain some, if not all, strategic actions. The third scholarly approach argues that aspects of human conduct can only be understood by becoming immersed within a specific strategic culture. It also discusses how early studies linking culture and strategic behavior focused on the idea of “national character,” shaped by language, religion, customs, socialization, and shared historical experiences. The main sources of strategic culture are identified as geography, climate and resources, history and experience, political structures, the nature of defense organizations, myths and symbols, key texts guiding appropriate strategic action, transnational norms, generational change, and the role of technology. The author concludes that understanding strategic culture is directly connected to the concept of tailored deterrence, emphasizing the importance of carefully targeting and contextualizing deterrence messages for potential adversaries.

Relation Strategic Culture, Strategy-Making, and China

Gardiner, M. (2021, September 7). The Strategy Bridge. The Strategy Bridge. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/7/relational-strategic-culture-strategy-making-and-china?rq=strategic%20culture

In this article, Michael Gardiner begins by arguing that historical and cultural experiences influence state decision-making, often in unconscious ways. The concept of strategic culture suggests that, while states operate within the same structural constraints of the international system, they nevertheless retain the agency to act in distinct ways. The study also examines China’s role in strategic culture through the ideas of Alastair Iain Johnston, who argued that China possesses two strategic cultures: one representing a symbolic or idealized set of strategic preferences, and another actively employed in Chinese statecraft. The discussion then introduces the notion of relationality within the strategic culture debate. This perspective rejects the premise that strategic culture must be observable uniformly across actors, illustrated through the example of North Korea and Japan, which served as a primary driver of China’s behavior during the 2017–2018 North Korean nuclear crisis. The author concludes that acknowledging the invisible power of strategic culture in the creation of strategy is essential for understanding underlying thought processes and developing contemporary strategies capable of addressing modern challenges.

Week 5

Law, Politics and The Use of Force (Book Chapter)

The chapter starts with the perception of international law, The common assumption is that at the international level the norm in response to legal edicts is breach. they argue that The common failure to recognize this is the consequence of another misleading idea, namely that to operate effectively it is essential that a system of law possesses the ‘legal trinity’ of a legislature, an effective and centralized police force, and a judiciary. They are three important factors why states obey law; coercion, self interest, legitimacy. To understand the breaches of law we need to know that Breach is invariably accompanied by an explanation based on recourse to legal argument. The fact that a state breaches a rule of international law does not in itself demonstrate the inefficacy of the rule or of international law more generally. Regarding Jus ad bellum is the side that governs and seeks to limit resort to armed force in the conduct of international relations. Followed by Jus In Bellum which governs and seeks to moderate the actual conduct of hostilities.

The Ethics of Law and Conflict

This chapter introduce the principals and laws for war, starting with the question when is it right to fight? According to the United Nations; states had an inherited right ti wage war whenever they believed that they had a case to do so. But after World War II the statement change article 2(4) of the UN Charter forbids the use of threat of force in international law. Although they are two exceptions states have right to self defence by article 51 of the charter and if it’s approved by the security council they can enforce action by article 39. Followed by Jus Ad Bellum when the threat is demonstrably imminent, international society had showed itself willing to tolerate pre-emption. the author concludes that without an ethical and legal constraint on both the decision to wage it (jus ad bellum) and its conduct (jus in bellum), war is nothing more than the application of brutal force.

Week 8 and 9

Irregular Warfare: Terrorism

The author start explaining arguing that the spirit of Clausewitz is still very much relevant to current and future irregular campaigns. He start defining both terrorism and guerrilla, Terrorism and insurgency are still viewed at best as a nuisance by many military professionals, or a form of ‘dirty war’ at worst. Those undertaking insurgency and terrorism are trying to find a way to use their strengths such as mobility, organization, and relative anonymity or stealth, against the weaknesses of their more powerful adversary. Time is an important element in the success of insurgencies, involving a non-linear progression that includes the space to manoeuvre and to gain legitimacy and/or support, all of which are necessary for eventual victory. The strategy of state success is based on isolating the insurgents, both physically and politically, The eradication of insurgents is often a slow process and will take different forms in different political and cultural contexts.

Counterinsurgency Warfare Chapter 1 and 2

The conflict results from the action of the insurgent aiming to seize power. A revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict. In revolutionary, masses move and then leaders appear. The author in this case mentioned as an example that when the Russian empire was falling, Lenin was in Switzerland. The key for the insurgents is the population cause the political will depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. Also for the insurgent lack from sufficient strength so a lot of time or years may sometimes pass before they has built up significant political. The author use the example of the revolutionary war in china that lasted twenty years. for insurgents promoting disorder is their main objective, it helps to disrupt the economy to also produce discontent. One the insurgent has acquired strength and possesses significant regular forces, it would seem that the war should become a conventional one. A civil war in which each camps hold a portion of the national territory.

In this chapter the author explain how to the groups that performed this may be successful. Firstly they need a cause in which they can transform into a concrete strength. Te lack of an unattractive cause is what retrains a priori apolitical crime syndicates from attempting to assume power, for they realize the only criminals will follow them. According to Mao Tse-tung when there is no problem there is no cause. What makes a country more vulnerable than another to insurgency is the depth and acuity of its existing problems. An an example the author wrote about the leadership of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, where it was explained that in every country that power is held by the oligarchy; indigenous or potential ground for a revolutionary war. The problem may be social, as when one class is exploited by another or denied of improving its lot. The problem became more serious when the society does not integrate. But after all what are the weaknesses of a counterinsurgent? The insurgent starting from zero while his opponent has every mean at his disposal. Absence of the problem in a country, national consensus, counterinsurgency leaders knowledge of counterinsugercy warfare and the machine for the control of the population. These are weaknesses written by the author for the insurgents

The author main goal for this chapter was to examined the present and emerging state of conventional military power, including its distribution, what it can and cannot do, what is changing and what is not. Conventional power was used frequently between 1815 and 1945. Military superiority underwrote European imperialism. After 1945, major states rarely used conventional force against each other, but did so more often against weaker states, which fought each other frequently. Overwhelming conventional power, along with nuclear weapons, make the United States the world leader. This strength supports dissuasion better than war. Also, The power of armies has not been transformed for close-quarters combat, or against guerrillas. New world powers are emerging, especially China and India, The impact of these changes will vary with the desire of states to tap economic power for strategic purposes, and with the skill of their policies. This chapters conclude with the idea that conventional power is part of the balance in every zone of conflict.

Week 11

Week 10

Humanitarian Intervention

Summary made by Andres, Anni, Michela and Taiisia

Liberal principles can assist in justifying humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions usually refer to the use of military force or other methods by external entities in another sovereign state in order to ensure the respect for human rights and prevent or stop humanitarian crises (e.g., genocides). They became more common since the Cold War era, evolving into coordinated United Nations (UN) Peace Operations, due to several factors: the need to enforce regional peace agreements, improve cooperation among major powers in the UN Security Council, growing public pressure in response to crises, and a stronger focus on human rights preservation and democratic governance.

The Crisis Response Operations (CRO) are the bridge between diplomacy and military aspects of humanitarian intervention. In contemporary conflicts, civilians have become increasingly vulnerable targets, suffering the direct consequences of weak governance. As a result, local armed groups rise to exploit instability, filling the power vacuum and inevitably leading to the collapse of the state. The main purpose of CROs, therefore, is to coordinate international actions, protect vulnerable civilians and deliver aid where necessary.

Recent crises showed that states and organizations struggle to manage multiple emergencies at the same time. Effective response requires coordination, rapid information sharing and regional cooperation. Moreover, peace operations face political limits, unclear mandates and gasps in resources. Strengthening intelligence, inclusivity and comprehensive approaches are the key to improving humanitarian intervention and crisis management.

Week 12

Strategic Studies: the West and The Rest?

The author of this chapter began his arguments on ethnocentrism which is an important feature of strategic studies, but it becomes especially acute when dealing with the non-Western world. The literature on strategic studies during the cold war typically ignored the specific interests and concerns of Third World countries and groups. The concept of national security that lies at the heart of strategic studies was unsuitable for analysing security issues in the Third World. Unlike for Western states, the security problems faced by Third World states more often come from domestic or regime insecurities than from external security concerns. A new dimension of strategic studies is concerned with human security, which should include both freedom from fear and freedom from want. It is important for strategic studies to reconcile the arguments for and against the broadening of security and strategy in a way that captures the security challenges facing the wider international community, and not just the West.

Methodology for Long Term Planning

Stojković, D., & Dahl, B. R. (2007). Methodology for long term defence planning (FFI Report No. 2007/00600). Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

The report outlines a structured methodology for long-term defence planning (LTDP), developed through Norwegian-Serbian research cooperation. It defines LTDP as an iterative, multi-stage process for setting long-term defence objectives and strategies aligned with national goals. The study emphasizes that LTDP is both technical and political, requiring coordination between planners and policymakers. It identifies eight stages: political guidance analysis, environmental assessment, mission analysis, planning situations development, capability requirements determination, capability assessment, options development, and solution selection. The methodology integrates multiple planning approaches—top-down, resource-constrained, technology-driven, risk-avoidance, incremental, scenario-based, capability-based, and threat-based—to create a flexible and realistic model. The key variables—ends, ways, and means—must remain balanced to prevent strategic gaps. The authors argue that LTDP improves decision-making, risk anticipation, and resource allocation while aligning defence capabilities with political and fiscal realities. Ultimately, effective LTDP provides a foundation for adaptive, long-range defence strategies that remain responsive to evolving technological, economic, and security environments.

Week 13

A new Agenda for Security and Strategy

The author in this chapter starts arguing about the security agenda a to determine if and how strategy can respond to these issues. First, if military units can take some action that addresses a particular problem or issue in a useful way, then the subject is of importance to strategy and strategists. Secondly, if military action somehow produces environmental, resource, or demographic consequences, then these issues are of interest to strategists. Thirdly, low politics are of strategic interest when they create effects that are likely to shape the way force is used in the future. A utilitarian assessment may be useful to determine if there is a new agenda for security and strategy. Globalization is increasing the number and severity of commons issues. Military action can result in direct environmental damage. Although they have not risen to the top of national security agendas, issues of low politics are beginning to interact with local political and military events to produce global consequences.

The Tragedy of the Commons

Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243

In The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett Hardin argues that some human problems have no purely technical solutions and instead require moral and social change. He illustrates this through the metaphor of a shared pasture where each herdsman, acting rationally in self-interest, overuses the common resource, leading to collective ruin. Hardin extends this logic to issues such as overpopulation, pollution, and resource depletion, where individual freedom leads to societal collapse. He criticizes reliance on conscience and voluntary restraint, noting that appeals to morality are self-eliminating in competitive environments. Instead, Hardin advocates for “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”—laws, taxes, or restrictions—to manage shared resources effectively. He concludes that freedom in a commons brings ruin to all and argues that population control must replace the ideal of unrestricted reproductive freedom. Recognizing the necessity of limiting individual liberties is, for Hardin, the only path to preserving the planet’s finite resources and ensuring the survival of humanity.